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Cable Television and Copyright:
Legislation and the Marketplace Model*
By STUART N. BROTMAN**
Section 111 of the Copyright Act of 1976 was intended to re-
solve the long-standing controversy regarding copyright pay-
ment by cable television systems that retransmit broadcast
signals. In section 111 of the Act, Congress set forth a compul-
sory license scheme for cable systems.' This scheme estab-
lishes a statutory fee schedule based on the gross revenues of
the cable system and the number of distant signals it carries.'
The Copyright Royalty Tribunal, a regulatory authority created
by the Act, is charged with the task of monitoring and adjust-
ing copyright fees "to reflect the relative roles of the copyright
owner and the copyright user in the product made available to
the public with respect to relative creative contribution, tech-
nological contribution, capital investment, cost, risk, and con-
tribution to the opening of new markets for creative expression
and media for their communication . . .. "
Yet, as new patterns for cable distribution evolve, it becomes
apparent that the provisions of the Act have not really disen-
tangled the cable-copyright knot.4 This article will discuss the
background of this continuing problem and how the Act fails to
* The views presented herein are solely those of the author; they are not in-
tended to represent the position of the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration, or any of its other employees.
** Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications
and Information, National Telecommunications and Information Administration;
Member, State Bar of California; B.S., Northwestern University; M.A., University of
Wisconsin; J.D., University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall).
1. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (Supp. 1 1977).
2. All cable systems, through the compulsory license fee, must pay a minimum
royalty of 0.675% of gross receipts. For systems carrying two to four distant signals,
the cable system must pay 0.425% of gross receipts, while for five or more distant sig-
nals, the system must pay 0.2% of gross receipts. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (2) (B) (Supp. I
1977). The license fee is for "the privilege of further transmitting any network pro-
gramming of a primary transmitter in whole or in part beyond the local service area of
such primary transmitter." 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (1) (B) (i) (Supp. 1 1977).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b) (1) (C) (Supp. 1 1977).
4. See Meyer, The Feat of Houdini or How the New Act Disentangles the CA TV-
Copyright Knot, 22 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REv. 545 (1977).
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remedy the conflict. It will suggest an alternative model-re-
transmission consent-that is designed to let marketplace
forces govern the relationship among broadcasters, cable sys-
tems, and copyright owners.
I
The Defects of the 1909 Copyright Act
In the 1950's, cable television emerged as a device to bring in
local broadcast signals, via a master antenna, to homes that
had difficulty receiving the conventional signal because of limi-
tations of terrain.' By the 1960's, however, these early systems
gave way to more complex ones that offered distant as well as
local signals to homes wired for cable reception.' These cable
systems imported broadcast signals without paying any roy-
alty to the copyright owners of the various programs being re-
transmitted. As a result, the broadcaster was the only party
liable for payment of a copyright royalty; cable systems prof-
ited from the service they offered since they did not pay for any
of its product. The cable system's master antenna merely pick-
ed up broadcast signals from the electromagnetic spectrum
and retransmitted them to homes by coaxial cable.
Fortnightly Corporation owned two such systems in West
Virginia that carried two local and three distant signals for a
flat monthly subscription rate. All signals were picked up by
Fortnightly's master antenna and were carried without editing.
The systems did not originate any programs. United Artists
Television held copyrights on some motion pictures that the
systems picked up from broadcasters. Unlike the broadcast-
ers, however, Fortnightly did not obtain licenses under these
copyrights. In the ensuing case, Fortnightly Corp. v. United
Artists Television, Inc.,' the cable distribution was evaluated
under the Copyright Act of 1909. Although United Artists con-
tended that Fortnightly's system infringed upon its exclusive
right under the Act to "perform ... publicly" its dramatic
works,' the Supreme Court held that the systems were not lia-
ble for copyright infringement under existing law. The Court's
reasoning was based upon an examination of the function that
5. See D. LE Duc, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FCC 60-113 (1973).
6. Id. at 114-36.
7. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 1(d) (1970) (superseded by Copyright Act of 1976).
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cable played in the "total process of television broadcasting
and reception."' Under this analysis, the Court concluded that
only broadcasters should be considered active "performers,"
since the role of the broadcaster is to select and procure pro-
gramming and to transmit the converted signals for public re-
ception.10 In contrast, the Court found that cable was a passive
system:
The function of CATV [cable] systems has little in common
with the function of broadcasters. CATV systems do not in fact
broadcast or rebroadcast. Broadcasters select the programs to
be viewed; CATV systems simply carry, without editing,
whatever programs they receive. Broadcasters procure pro-
grams and propagate them to the public; CATV systems re-
ceive programs that have been released to the public and carry
them by private channels to additional viewers. We hold that
CATV operators, like viewers and unlike broadcasters, do not
perform the programs that they receive and carry."
Cable systems' freedom from copyright liability was further
enhanced by a subsequent Supreme Court decision, Tele-
prompter Corp. v. CBS, Inc. 2 The Teleprompter cable systems
were substantially less passive than those owned by Fort-
nightly, since Teleprompter was utilizing a microwave system
to import distant signals for retransmission as well as originat-
ing some of its own programming. Accordingly, CBS, which
owned a number of television stations, argued that the Tele-
prompter systems were functionally equivalent to broadcast
stations and should, for copyright purposes, be deemed to have
"performed." Although this argument was accepted by the
court below," it was rejected by the Supreme Court. The
Court refused to distinguish between systems like Fort-
nightly's, which picked up existing signals with an antenna,
and those like Teleprompter's, which imported distant broad-
cast signals that could not normally be received by a master
antenna. The fact that the cable system itself originated pro-
grams was held to be irrelevant in determining copyright liabil-
ity.'4 In the Court's view, the central question still involved the
reception and rechanneling of the copyrighted materials by the
9. 392 U.S. 390, 395-97 (1968).
10. Id. at 397-98.
11. Id. at 400-01.
12. 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
13. CBS, Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp. 476 F.2d 338, 350 (2d Cir. 1973).
14. 415 U.S. at 405.
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cable systems. Again, the Court found cable systems to be pas-
sive receivers since they carried, without editing, whatever
programs they received." The Court reasoned that even
though distant signals were normally not available to local
cable audiences, no copyright infringement existed because
the material had already been released to the public at large."
As a result of these two cases, the copyright-cable problem
shifted to Congress and the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC). The revision process that culminated in the pas-
sage of the 1976 Act was already under way, but the legislative
route took a number of years. In the interim, the FCC promul-
gated regulations aimed at minimizing the problem. 7 In the
1972 Cable Rules," the Commission established a complex sys-
tem designed to limit the ability of cable to import copyrighted
material without payment. The most important provisions in
this regard limited the number of distant signals that cable op-
erators in the top 50 markets could import and guaranteed ex-
clusivity for non-network programs carried by broadcasters for
the term of the contract between the broadcaster and the copy-
right owner.19
In 1976, Congress passed the new Copyright Act, effective
January 1, 1978, mandating compulsory license fees for all
cable systems. The Act further provided that fees should be
pooled and distributed by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal to
copyright holders.2 0 Thus, cable systems have for the first time
been brought within the structure of statutory copyright law.
They must now account for programs received in any manner
from broadcast stations and must pay a small percentage of
gross revenues as a compulsory license fee.2 '
II
New Patterns of Cable Distribution:
The "Superstations"
On October 25, 1978, the FCC officially endorsed an "open en-
15. Id. at 410.
16. Id. at 409-10.
17. See LE Duc, supra note 5, at 137-82; S. RIVKIN, A NEw GUIDE TO FEDERAL CABLE
TELEVISION REGULATIONs 45-123 (1978).
18. See Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C. 2d 143 (1972).
19. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.51-76.161 (1977).
20. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111(d) (4), (5) (Supp. 1 1977).
21. See note 2, supra.
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try" policy for satellite-distributed television "superstations."2 2
The prototype superstation is WTBS, Atlanta, an independent
UHF-station that programs primarily sports and feature films.
Utilizing satellite channels leased by a resale common carrier,
WTBS reaches cable systems in 43 states and an estimated au-
dience of more than two million homes.2 3 The cable systems
receive signals from the satellite by earth station and pay the
resale common carrier, Southern Satellite Systems, Inc., ten
cents per month for each cable subscriber.2 4
Since the Commission announced its open entry policy,2 5
three more superstations have begun transmitting to cable sys-
tems throughout the country. Approximately 900 earth sta-
tions receive programming from one or more of these stations
and retransmit the signal to over five million homes. 2 6 The new
group includes WGN-TV, Chicago, whose signal is relayed by
United Video Inc., a resale common carrier that leases chan-
nels on the RCA Satcom I satellite; KTVU(TV), San Francisco-
Oakland, distributed by Satellite Communications Systems
Inc.; and WOR-TV, New York, which is distributed by Eastern
Microwave, Inc. Cable systems receiving signals from these
stations pay the same ten-cent monthly fee per subscriber to
the respective common carrier.2 7
The freedom of a common carrier to lease satellite channels
and relay broadcast signals to a cable system's earth station
has led to differences in superstation broadcasting practices
concerning the carriage of signals. WTBS, for example, can be
characterized as an active superstation; it pursues a cable au-
dience and solicits advertising at rates that reflect the in-
creased viewership.2" WGN-TV, in contrast, is a passive
superstation; it neither solicits distant cable systems for pick-
up nor attempts to charge advertisers more for its increased
area of coverage. This status has hurt the station's ability to
contract for programming. In 1979, WGN-TV obtained the
rights to broadcast the NCAA basketball playoff games featur-
22. See United Video, Inc., 44 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1217 (1978).
23. Montgomery, An Atlanta TV Outlet Seeks to Blanket U.S., Get Ad Rates to
Match, Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1979, at 1, col. 1. See The State of the Superstations, BROAD-
CASTING, Jul. 23, 1979, at 29.
24. See Bus. WEEK, Nov. 27, 1978, at 36.
25. United Video, Inc., 44 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1217 (1978).
26. INTERMEDIA, May 1979, at 4.
27. The State of the Superstations, BROADCASTING, Jul. 23, 1979, at 29.
28. Id.
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ing three area schools. But the sale was ultimately refused
since the station is picked up by satellite and distributed na-
tionwide to cable systems. The sale in Chicago, in effect, be-
came a national sale, so that the copyright owner's intended
bargain was undermined.2 9 The station, which has no control
over the carriage of its signal, was similarly impaired in arrang-
ing a deal that would have resulted in programming aimed at
the area that it was licensed to serve. The bargain, in short,
was not controlled by marketplace forces. Rather, it was gov-
erned by the extraneous factor of cable reception that was be-
yond the control of the bargaining parties.
Recently, a third category has emerged: the involuntary
superstation. ASN, Inc., a resale common carrier, was granted
permission by the FCC to retransmit the signal of station
KTTV(TV), Los Angeles, via satellite to cable systems. KTTV
subsequently filed a petition with the Commission to review
this decision, claiming that ASN, Inc., was appropriating with-
out consent, and.selling for a profit, programs the station had
purchased for release to the Los Angeles television market.30
Despite differences among the kinds of superstations, a com-
mon problem emerges. In each situation, marketplace forces
are hindered by the compulsory license, which is an artificial
pricing scheme that subsidizes cable systems at the expense of
broadcasters and/or copyright owners. Thus, the emergence of
the superstations again raised the sensitive cable-copyright
problem. Copyright owners who originally contracted with lo-
cal independent television stations now find that signals are
picked up by satellite and transmitted to cable systems across
the country. Although there is the statutory protection of the
compulsory license, it still may not afford the copyright owner
equitable financial compensation, since the compulsory license
fee extracts a very small percentage of gross revenues.
As the superstation benefits from increasing audiences, it
can revise its advertising rates and attact new national adver-
tisers. In fact, this is the way that WTBS is promoted." Cable
systems benefit by receiving additional, popular programming
that in turn attracts new subscribers. Ironically, the copyright
29. [1979] 19 TELEVISION DIG., Mar. 19, 1979, at 4.
30. See Soured on Satellites, BROADCASTING, Jul. 9, 1979, at 50; Battle Rages at FCC
over Reluctant Superstation, BROADCASTING, Jul. 23, 1979, at 44-45.
31. WTBS, Atlanta, has already set new national rates and is beginning to attract
national advertisers. Montgomery, supra note 23, at 1, col. 1.
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owner is frozen out of the marketplace by the very compulsory
license scheme that was designed for his or her protection.
The choice is to sell at a local rate, and accept the compulsory
royalty, or not to sell at all.
Congress provided the Copyright'Royalty Tribunal with flex-
ible powers, enabling it to increase rates to account for techno-
logical developments and changing FCC policies.3 2 But at best,
the Tribunal can only approximate the conditions of the real
economic marketplace.3 3 It may be argued that copyright hold-
ers have the free choice to withhold selling the product to a
superstation; but refused sales, in the end, will only result in
limiting diversity of programming for both the local viewers of
the superstation and those who receive it through cable sys-
tems. Such an outcome is antithetical to the First Amendment
goal of promoting diversity in mass media.34 The FCC, since
1972, has provided some protection for copyright owners by en-
forcing reasonable exclusivity contracts for non-network pro-
grams made with broadcasters." The Commission, however,
has recently proposed rescinding these rules. The effect would
be to allow the importation of programming for cable systems
in a market where the television station has obtained exclusive
rights from the copyright owner. Consequently, if this
change is adopted, the copyright owner would be entitled to
receive from cable systems only the minimal income derived
from the compulsory license fee. The local television station,
unable to obtain exclusive rights, will lower its bid, and the
copyright owner will be at a disadvantage when bargaining
with either medium.
III
An Alternative Model: Retransmission Consent
One means of alleviating the new copyright problem caused
by the emergence of superstations is to require, either by law
or FCC regulation, a mechanism that allows the copyright own-
32. 17 U.S.C. §§ 801(b) (1) (C), (2) (B) (Supp. 1 1977).
33. See generally Besen, Manning & Mitchell, Copyright Liability for Cable Televi-
sion: Compulsory Licensing and the Coase Theorem, 21 J.L. & ECON. 67 (1978).
34. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
35. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.92-76.161 (1977).




er to compete in the marketplace on an equal basis with broad-
casters and cable systems. This result could be achieved by
requiring cable systems to obtain retransmission consent from
broadcasters before carrying their signals to their viewers.
Broadcasters, in turn, could only grant such consent if they
had previously bargained for it with the copyright owner. If
this had not been done, the copyright owner could seek injunc-
tive relief or monetary damages from the station," because
broadcasters have been subject since 1909 to full copyright lia-
bility." The broadcaster, who deals with program suppliers in
the normal course of business, is the logical agent for facilitat-
ing retransmission consent. Cable systems, however, may
wish to establish their own agents, or middlemen organizations
may develop to bargain for various copyrighted programming
packages.
A retransmission consent requirement could restore balance
among the competing interests and could reconcile the still-ex-
isting incompatibility between broadcasting and cable, the two
delivery systems for non-network programs. Once the super-
station revises its advertising rates to reflect the nationwide
cable audience, it will be in a position to pay the copyright
owners (e.g., program suppliers such as MCA, Inc. and Para-
mount Pictures, Inc.) for the right to distribute programs na-
tionally through cable systems. If increased revenues from
advertising were insufficient or if the superstation did not re-
vise its rates, the broadcaster could pass on some of its pro-
gramming costs (i.e., the price negotiated with the copyright
owner) to the cable systems in the form of a reasonable fee for
obtaining retransmission consent. If this were done, the cable
systems could in turn raise subscriber rates to reflect market
demand. In any event, each distribution system would get
what it was willing to pay for, without worrying about a third-
party undermining the bargain.
A system of retransmission consent for advertiser-sup-
ported, non-network programming is also consistent with the
other primary scheme of video distribution: pay television.3 9
37. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 504 (Supp. 1 1977).
38. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. at 398-99; Copy-
right Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)
(Supp. 1 1977)). See also H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1909).
39. Pay television is a system whereby a subscriber, utilizing either a coaxial cable
hook-up or a receiver equipped to unscramble coded broadcast signals, is charged a fee
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Pay television entrepreneurs in both the cable and broadcast-
ing fields are governed by marketplace forces. They must bar-
gain with copyright owners for the sale of programming and
are subject to full copyright liability. The only difference be-
tween pay television and cable that retransmits broadcast sig-
nals is that in the latter system, the advertiser, rather than the
viewer, pays directly for the program.
The concept of requiring retransmission consent is not new.
It was first proposed by the FCC in 1968 to short-circuit the
Fortnightly controversy,' but was abandoned by the Commis-
sion in 1972 as not feasible under then-existing market condi-
tions. 4 ' Since there was total disharmony between
broadcasting and cable at that time, it was likely that broad-
casters would have withheld retransmission consent in an ef-
fort to eliminate cable as a viable competing distribution
system. 42
The situation today, however, is far different. Cable has
achieved increased penetration in the marketplace," and there
are indications that it may finally expand to cover significant
urban markets." The satellite has also come into the picture.
Independent television stations can now move to expand their
audiences and advertising revenues; cable systems are seeking
more attractive programs to gain additional subscribers; com-
mon carriers are interested in leasing channels for satellite dis-
tribution; and program suppliers, as always, are aiming for
increased sales of their product.
on a per-program or per-channel basis for receiving specialized programming (e.g., fea-
ture films or sports events).
40. See Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 153 n.24.
41. Id. at 150-54, 165.
42. During the pendency of the rulemaking that froze distant signal authorizations
except for those that requested waivers by imposing retransmission consent (Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry in Docket No. 18397, 15 F.C.C.2d 417
(1968)), the Commission authorized only two experiments with this mechanism: one
by Top Vision Cable Company and the other by Tri-Cities Cable TV, Inc. The Tri-
Cities experiment was terminated "before useful results were obtained." Cable Tele-
vision Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 153 n.24. Apparently, broadcasters during this
period were reluctant to initiate actions that would have allowed retransmission con-
sent to function.
43. There are now nearly 4000 cable systems operating; over 19 percent of Ameri-
can homes are wired for cable. [1979] 19 TELEVISION DIG., Mar. 5, 1979, at 2. Within the
past ten years, cable penetration into homes has more than tripled. C. STERLING & T.
HAIGHT, THE MASS MEDIA: ASPEN INSTITUTE GUIDE TO COMMUNICATION INDUSTRY
TRENDS 56 (1978).
44. See Vastly Broadened Cable Service in Columbus, Ohio, Planned by Warner,
BROADCASTING, Feb. 14, 1977, at 33.
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There would be, in fairness, serious problems left to work
out upon adoption of this model. Ideally, if the retransmission
consent requirement governed this area exclusively, and the
compulsory license for secondary transmission by cable sys-
tems was abolished, all cable programming-whether adver-
tiser-supported or pay-would have to be obtained in the
marketplace. Yet, this would be inconsistent with the congres-
sional intent in enacting the Copyright Act of 1976," which
sought to resolve the problem through compulsory licensing, a
scheme that represented a consensus among broadcasters,
cable systems, and copyright owners. As a matter of equity
and political practicality, compulsory licensing should be re-
tained for all existing cable systems, along with the existing
FCC rules that enforce exclusivity agreements for non-net-
work programming.
For new cable systems, or for systems expanding into new
franchise areas, a retransmission consent requirement rather
than the compulsory license scheme should govern. These
systems are full-fledged competitors that can bargain on their
own, and they should not be protected in the same way that
Congress protected cable in the 1976 Copyright Act, when the
model cable operation was more akin to the Fortnightly and
Teleprompter systems, rather than the multi-channel, multi-
service medium of today and certainly of tomorrow.46 This dis-
tinction justifies a two-tier system, and there is no reason that
both compulsory licensing and retransmission consent cannot
coexist. These latter systems should be exempt from the FCC
45. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 88-101 (1976); S. REP. No. 473, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 78-83 (1975).
46. A number of other independent television stations, such as WPIX(TV), New
York; WSBK-TV, Boston; KBMA-TV, Kansas City, Mo.; and KTVT(TV), Dallas, are
being distributed through traditional cable carriage and microwave links to areas ex-
tending well beyond their respective broadcast service areas. They, too, are in effect
"superstations." The State of the Superstations, BROADCASTING, Jul. 23, 1979, at 29. Pre-
sumably, Congress had both cable and microwave links in mind when it enacted the
Copyright Act of 1976, so that the compulsory license should be applicable. On the
other hand, is it really a meaningful distinction to treat satellite transmission of super-
stations differently than microwave transmission of superstations? This question,
which is not dealt with in the legislative history of the Act, should be addressed when
Congress or the FCC considers the imposition of a retransmission consent require-
ment. In this regard, the difference in transmission modes seems less important than
the difference between primitive cable systems and the more advanced ones. Thus,
retransmission consent could be made applicable to any superstation that was re-
ceived by a new or expanding cable system, regardless of how the signal was transmit-
ted.
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rules governing non-network program exclusivity, because re-
transmission consent itself is designed to provide for fair bar-
gaining. In this way, at least for the future of cable
development, the marketplace forces will be allowed to oper-
ate.
Conclusion
It is unrealistic to assert that the Copyright Act of 1976 finally
resolved the CATV-copyright controversy. The Act represents
a solid effort to mediate this controversy among the parties in
the aftermath of Fortnightly and Teleprompter. Given the evo-
lutionary process of this legislation, it is understandable that
Congress could not account for rapid technological develop-
ments or new FCC policies. The Act, in creating a Copyright
Royalty Tribunal, acknowledges this.17 The Tribunal could at
present seek to resolve the controversy in light of the develop-
ment of superstations, but this could only be in the form of
mandated fees that do not necessarily reflect what the parties
themselves would bargain for. Although Congress could take a
second look at the problem, it may be -unwilling to do so since
the new Act was so recently enacted. Therefore, the most prac-
tical forum for considering the problem is the FCC, since it can
harmonize its old cable rules with the competitive environ-
ment of today and can account more readily for emerging tech-
nological trends. Eliminating the non-network program
exclusivity rules while retaining a compulsory licensing
scheme would merely shift the situs of government regulation
from the FCC to the Copyright Royalty Tribunal. Although
this effort would be deregulatory in form, it would not be con-
sistent with the ultimate principle of deregulation that a re-
transmission consent requirement would advance: allowing
marketplace forces to govern where full and fair competition,
such as that which exists among broadcasters, new and ex-
panding cable systems, and copyright owners, is possible.
47. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 801(b) (1) (C), (2) (B) (Supp. 1 1977).
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